CSU-Carig
Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises & scarce credit [electronic resource] /
by Calomiris, Charles W.
| Item type | Location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Electronic Books
|
E-Resource Section | E-Books | 332.109 (Browse shelf) | Available |
If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses.
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